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Co-operation Between Regulators and
Law Enforcement: A Canadian
Concern
Daniel P Murphy*
The fight against financial crime is one of the major
challenges of our times. We emphasise that, as both financial
services and crime become increasingly globalized, this challenge can only be met if all major financial centres work
together. Effective co-operation between financial regulators
and law enforcement authorities at the international level is an
essential element of this (co-operation) ..
I.

Introduction

In May 1998 the Finance Ministers of the G7 leading industrialised democracies, met in London to prepare for the May 15-17,
1998 Birmingham Summit. These ministers continued the work
that had developed out of earlier summits. In this paper there is
no need to review all of the many achievements from various
summits since 1975's in Rambouillet, France. It is sufficient to note
that as the cold war wound down economic and other concerns
occupied the attention of the summit leaders. In the last few
Summits the problem of crime has assumed greater importance in
the Summit discussions. This has had a positive impact in law
enforcement.
Crime has been seen as a global issue of concern in several
Summits. This concern has achieved significant results.' One issue
* The opinions expressed are the author's and do not reflect the positions
of the Department of Justice
1. An excerpt from paragraph 7 of the Conclusions of G7 FinanceMinisters,
May 8, 1998 at the 1998 Birmingham Summit <http://birmingham.g8summit.gov.uk/forfin/finance.shtml>.
2. It is trite to refer to the 1989 Economic Summit since it was the precursor
to the development of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The FATF,
comprised of 26 countries, the European Commission and the Gulf Co-operation
Council promotes the development of anti-money laundering controls and enhanced co-operation in counter-money laundering efforts among its membership
and around the world.
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that has developed out of the Summit process is the recognition of
the need to foster co-operation between regulators and criminal
investigators. The commitment to greater regulator/law enforcement co-operation has grown out of the last four Summit meetings.
It was also an important point for consultation in the many presummit meetings of officials undertaken to prepare the discussions
for the Birmingham Summit.
This regulatory/law enforcement co-operation issue arose at
the 1996 Halifax Summit, where the participants made a commitment to improve international communication between regulators
and law enforcement agencies in cases involving financial fraud.
The 1997 Denver Economic Statement called on officials to report
and make recommendations on international co-operation in cases
involving serious financial crime and regulatory abuse.3 G-7
experts subsequently reviewed the issue and, while they did not
identify any serious gaps in domestic and international sharing
arrangements pursuant to the Lyon Summit, they left the door
open to further dialogue.
The work of the Denver and Birmingham Summits is the
precursor to the suggestion that nations consider how regulators
can more effectively work with law enforcement. This is an
interesting development. We need to remember that the result of
the recommendation from various Summits can go well beyond the
immediate members of the Summit. The work of the FATF and
the various regional bodies that have developed out of the FATF
illustrate this fact. If the Summit statement on financial crime is
aggressively advanced and picked up within the work of the
Financial Action Task Force many nations will be called upon to
undertake similar work.
In this paper I will briefly examine this issue as it relates to
Canadian law on search and seizure. When law enforcement is
allowed to obtain information held by regulators on the basis of cooperation between the regulator and law enforcement the initial
justification for the regulator's collection of the evidence shifts. I
will not review the issue of a regulator's statutory restrictions
against the disclosure of information they collect in the course of
their activities. Others can deal with that issue. This is a larger

3. Paragraph 28 of the Denver's "Summit of the Eight" public report states:
We reiterate our commitment to improve international co-operation between law
enforcement agencies and financial regulators on cases involving serious financial
crimes and regulatory abuse. We ask our experts to report and make recommendations at next year's Summit.
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undertaking and restrictions on time and space preclude such a
review. 4 I will briefly discuss our national privacy law but, again,
this issue is left to another discussion. The significant implication
in this commitment to co-operate lies with the impact of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter), Canada's
basic constitutional protection. I will therefore look at the impact
the Chartermay play on the commitment to greater co-operation.
II.

The Recommendation

It is useful to consider the full scope of the Finance Ministers
conclusions in paragraph 7's commitment, from the May 8,1998 premeeting to the Birmingham Summit. This paragraph must be
considered together with subsequent paragraphs since they
specifically deal with financial crimes. The brief extract of the
conclusion of Finance Ministers set out at the top of this paper
merely opens the stage. The relevant paragraphs on financial crime
read as follows:
Financial Crime
7.

The fight against financial crime is one of the major
challenges of our times. We emphasise that, as both
financial services and crime become increasingly globalised,
this challenge can only be met if all major financial centres
work together. Effective co-operation between financial
regulators and law enforcement authorities at the international level is an essential element of this. A G7 expert
group was set up by the Denver Summit to consider how
this co-operation can be improved within our countries.
We now agree to:
* review our laws and procedures concerning information
exchange between financial regulators and law
enforcement agencies against a common list of key
elements for effective co-operation;
• identify by October what modifications are desirable,
consistent with fundamental national and international legal principles, to improve our systems and to
implement such measures as quickly as possible;
" take forward a number of practical steps to improve cooperation;

4. See the article by John L. Laskin, Enforcement Powers of Administrative
Agencies, Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures 1992 (Toronto, Carswell
1992) at 191.
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* disseminate a G7 Reference Guide to Procedures and
Contact Points on -Information-Exchange-to-financial
regulators and law enforcement agencies in our
countries and to expand this Guide to cover all major
financial centre countries.
8.
9.

We have instructed the G7 expert group to provide a
report on progress on all these areas and any further
recommendations in preparation for the Koln Summit.
We also recognise that action must not be confined to G7
members and we emphasise that all countries should
provide effective international administrative and judicial
co-operation. In particular, we are concerned at the
number of countries and territories, including some
financial offshore centres, which continue to offer excessive
banking secrecy and allow screen companies to be used for
illegal purposes. We recognise that the Financial Action
Task Force (FATF) has already taken significant steps in
this area and endorse FATF's efforts to support the
Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors in its mutual
evaluation process. We therefore call on the FATF to
review the present position and make recommendations to
Ministers by the KOln Summit on what can be done to
rectify these abuses.

The Finance Ministers statement went on to commend the
work of the FATF and support the expansion plans for that
organisation. The recommendations in favour of co-operation
may result in a shift from regulatory compliance and well understood administrative law concepts to an expanded commitment
directed to co-operation with law enforcement in order to attack
financial crime. This will mean that a regulator will have parallel
considerations when they undertake their responsibilities. Equally,
law enforcement may have unreasonable expectations that they will
obtain an information windfall.
A. The Problem
We should start with the position that their financial crime
recommendations and the work of the FATF are examples of an
expansive approach to law enforcement. The global problem
associated with money laundering illustrates this fact. This concern
has evolved over the last decade. The commitment to attack

5.

Supra at note 1, paragraphs 10, 11 and 12.
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laundering activities associated with any serious crime, rather than
a more limiting reference to laundering of money obtained from
the illicit drug trade, means that law enforcement may have
significant allies within the regulatory community. This commitment may create expectations, for law enforcement, that may be
misplaced. Equally, regulators may reasonably expect that law
enforcement will be more open to their needs and equally ready to
assist regulators.
Their mutual expectation may also trigger legal impediments
that vary depending upon the differing national laws when the
required co-operation is between different nations. It can also
conflict with domestic laws in a particular country in light of the
nature of the regulatory agency and statutory controls against
disclosure of information in a regulator's enabling statute.
Regulators and law enforcement have impediments that impact
upon this expectation of a new co-operation between these sectors.
Their mandates differ. Their expertise varies. A globalised
financial system benefits many, criminals included, yet domestic
laws sometimes prevent co-operation. This last consideration is
important since regulator responsibilities vary between countries.
In some jurisdictions, the scope of a regulator's activity is more
analogous to a law enforcement activity.6 Other regulators are
more concerned with good governance or regulatory compliance
options rather than enforcement priorities.7 Some regulators have
a hybrid role that includes both elements. In addition, many
regulators have specific restrictions on the disclosure of any
information they may collect.8 Finally, national privacy laws and
constitutional protections can each establish unexpected impediments to the commitment to co-operate.
B. Canada'sPosition
In Canada, the commencement on any analysis of the
commitment to participate in parallel proceedings between

6. The United States Securities and Exchange Commission is an example of
this type of agency.
7. Canada's Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI)
illustrates this type of agency.
8. In Canada a variety of laws illustrate this point. Section 241 of the Income
Tax Act may be the best example since it creates a criminal offence for any
employee of our National Revenue who improperly co-operates or discloses tax
information. Another example can be seen in Canada's Office of the Superintendent of FinancialInstitutions Act. R.S., 1985, c. 18 (3rd Supp.). This office is the
responsible regulator for all significant financial institutions in Canada.
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regulators and law enforcement must start with our Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. Section 8 of the Charter reads as follows:
"Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search
or seizure."
There is a significant body of case law regarding constitutional
protection. The scope of this section, and time, precludes a
detailed analysis of this law but it is sufficient to indicate that every
individual in Canada has the constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure. In a regulatory context, the
Charter plays a significant role whenever information is compelled
from clients who are the subject of the regulators scrutiny.9 In
addition, Canada, like most nations, depends upon an extensive
system of regulatory schemes in modern commerce. The number
of agencies continually grows. In one case, Belgoma Transportation
Ltd. (Belgoma) v. Ontario (Director of Employment Standards)'
the Ontario Court of Appeal notes that at the time of their
decision there were 223 provincial public statutes, 61 private
statutes, 86 regulations and numerous municipal by-laws that
allowed various agencies undertaking a regulatory activity to enter
land and premises. This did not include federal statutes or similar
laws in the other Canadian Provinces. There are so many agencies
that the commitment to greater co-operation between these
agencies and law enforcement may achieve unexpected results.
In the Thomson Newspaper case" the court had to consider
a case where the individual appellants, who were officers of specific
corporations, were the subject of a Restrictive Trade Practice
Commission inquiry. The appellants sought the court's intervention
against an order compelling the officers to testify before and
produce documents for the inquiry. This case dealt with various
Charter provisions but, for our purposes, section 7 and 8 were
pivotal to the decision. Regulators need business records and the
power to obtain such records in order to undertake their functions.
The subsequent use of that collected information can have a pivotal
role in any review of the regulator's functions and powers. There
were several judgements in the Thomson case but a common

9. There are many examples. The Supreme Court of Canada, in a trilogy of
cases, canvassed this issue in our Restrictive Trade Practices Commission and the
Income Tax Act. See, Thomson Newspapers Ltd. et al v. Director of Investigations & Research et al, [1990] 1 S.C.R 425, 54 C.C.C. (3d) 417 and Stelco Inc. v.
Canada (Attorney General), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 617, 55 C.C.C. (3d) 227 and R. v.
McKinlay Transport Ltd, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 627, 55 C.C.C. (3d) 530.
10. (1985), 51 O.R (2d) 509 (C.A.) at 511.
11. Supra at note 8.
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thread on the constitutional issue in section 8 of the Charteris seen
in Justice Wilson's dissent, where the following statement is
advanced:
...[W]hat may be reasonable in the regulatory or civil context
may not be reasonable in a criminal or quasi-criminal context.
What is important is not so much that the strict criteria be
mechanically applied in every case but that the legislation
respond in a meaningful
way to the concerns identified by
12
Dickson J. in Hunter.
The regulatory context justifies the regulator's action in
conducting an investigation or inquiry. If sharing of the information collected by the regulator is one possibility then a court may
have an additional consideration when it reviews the regulator's
conduct. A regulatory regime, for example, can impose a requirement on the individuals who are subject to the regime to keep and
maintain records. In some cases, those records can justify a
prosecution of the participant in the regulatory scheme for an
offence under the scheme.
In R. v. Fitzpatrick13 the Supreme Court of Canada considered the admissibility of compelled information. In that case, the
appellant was a commercial fisherman charged with over fishing.
The appellant's hail reports and logs, documents required under the
relevant regulations, were used to prosecute the appellant. The
Regulations under the Fisheries Act protected conservation and
management of a resource. The appellant was a participant in this
regulatory scheme and he was obliged to maintain the records as
a condition of the licence he accepted.
If compelled records support the enforcement of the specific
statute or regulations that create the regulatory scheme there are
minimal constitutional concerns. On the other hand, if the compelled records are used in another unrelated investigation other
considerations will apply. The search and seizure of these types of
documents, in a regulatory context, is not the same as in a criminal
context. 14 In the Fitzpatrick case, the information was used in a

12. Thomson Newspaper v. Canada, supra at S.C.R page 495-496,C.C.C. (3d)
at page 468.
13. [19951 4 S.C.R. 159; (1995), 18 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 237 and the case comment
by Stan Berger at 18 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 283.
14. In Fitzpatrick,the court opined, at S.C.R pages 182-183, CELR, page 258
as follows:
My conclusion that it is not abusive for the state to prosecute those who
overfish, using their own hail reports and fishing logs as evidence of the
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prosecution undertaken in a legislative and regulatory scheme

where the appellant voluntarily participated.

The move to co-

operate and share information between regulator and criminal law

enforcement raises different concerns such as privilege, confidentiality and compellability.

Business records maintained by participants who are subject to
a regulatory scheme and the records of the regulator raise search

and seizure considerations when law enforcement attempts to
access the regulator's information. Law enforcement is faced with
this problem if they try to access the individual's business records.

Why should they have a less onerous problem when they try to
access the same information from a regulator? The use of the
records, in a law enforcement context, may be problematic.

There is a significant concern with respect to invasions of
informational privacy.15 In order to be sure that a constitutional

offence, is strengthened by reference to this Court's jurisprudence on the
application of s. 8 of the Charter in the regulatory context. In applying
a contextual approach under s. 8, this Court has repeatedly emphasized
that searches and seizures of documents relating to activity known to be
regulated by the state are not subject to the same high standard as
searches and seizures in the criminal context. This is because a decreased
expectation of privacy exists respecting records that are produced during
the ordinary course of business; see in particular my reasons in both
Thomson Newspapers, supra, at pp. 506-8, and Comit6 paritaire de
l'industrie de la chemise v. Potash, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 406, at pp. 420-21 and
424, as well as those of Wilson J. in R. v. McKinlay Transport Ltd.,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 627, at pp. 645-47, L'Heureux-Dub6 J. in Comitd
paritaire, at pp. 443-44, and Sopinka J. in R. v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281,
at pp. 291-96. In my view a similar standard should be applied to the use
in a regulatory prosecution of records that are statutorily compelled as
a condition of participation in the regulatory area. Little expectation of
privacy can attach to these documents, since they are produced precisely
to be read and relied upon by state officials. Similarly, I do not believe
it is inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice for the Crown
to rely upon these documents in a prosecution for overfishing. The documents should not be equated to involuntary confessions to investigators,
reflecting as they do instead the voluntary compliance by commercial
fishers with the statutory requirements of the regulated fishing regime.
The principle against self-incrimination under s. 7 of the Charter should
not be understood to elevate all records produced under statutory
compulsion to the status of compelled testimony at a criminal or
investigative hearing.
15. In R. v. Plante, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281 at 293, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 203 at 213 the
Supreme Court of Canada held that:
"In fostering the underlying values of dignity, integrity and autonomy, it
is fitting that s. 8 of the Charter should seek to protect a biographical
core of personal information which individuals in a free and democratic
society would wish to maintain and control from dissemination to the
state. This would include information which tends to reveal intimate
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impediment does not operate to prevent co-operation between a
regulator and law enforcement it is important to appreciate that,
generally, information can only be disclosed as a result of an
independent judicial authorization in the criminal law context, such
as a search warrant. Such authorizations may or may not be
conditional. The failure to obtain a proper judicial authorization
to obtain information can have a serious impact upon a subsequent
law enforcement investigation. 6

If you consider the financial

information maintained by banks in Canada, you will observe that
there is no legal requirement to report. There is, however, a strong

disincentive to voluntarily co-operate if arguments are made that
the financial institution is the custodian of the type of biographical
core of personal information deserving of Charterprotection.
Timely and properly collected financial information would aid
in investigations of any financial, drug and proceeds of crime

investigation. In a law enforcement context, the manner of
collection of the information is important. This is because a target
of a criminal investigation and charge will attack the procedure
used to collect evidence. Therefore, the evidence must be properly

accessed by law enforcement. This will reduce the risk that a court
might subsequently reject evidence in light of a taint argument
based upon how the police initially obtained the financial information.

details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual. The
computer records investigated in the case at bar while revealing the
pattern of electricity consumption in the residence cannot reasonably be
said to reveal intimate details of the appellant's life since electricity
consumption reveals very little about the personal lifestyle or private
decisions of the occupant of the residence. Therefore the information
collected by regulatory agencies will frequently be subject to a Charter
restriction vis-A-vis subsequent disclosure to law enforcement...
The most obvious illustration of this may be seen in the administration of
Canada's Income Tax Act. Tax auditors generally perform a regulatory function
in the course of an examination of a taxpayers annual return. The law requires
all taxpayers to maintain records and respond to inquiries by the taxation authorities. If the audit function in a taxation review shifts towards a tax evasion or
criminal fraud investigation different Charter expectations are created. This
shifting focus was specifically recognised, by the Supreme Court of Canada in R.
v. McKinlay Transport supra; Knox Construction Ltd. et al v. Canada [1990] 2
S.C.R. 338; Baron v. Canada [993] 1 S.C.R. 416,78 C.C.C. (3d) 510 and Kouretissis
v. MNR [1993] 2 S.C.R. 53, 81 C.C.C. 286.
16. Banking information illustrates this point. Canada has established a
mandatory record-keeping requirement to combat money laundering in The
Proceedsof Crime (money laundering)Act R.S.C. c. P-25.5. There is no reporting
requirement.
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Currently, criminal investigators may rely upon their network
of contacts in financial institutions to "tip" them about suspicious
transactions. 17 This can be risky in a criminal investigation. There
is a limited disclosure justification for persons who suspect criminal
money laundering activity. Canada's Criminal Code provides a
It does not ensure that the
defence for the record holder.'"
information provided to the law enforcement agency is admissible
in a subsequent trial or that the collection of that information does
not taint subsequent steps in the investigation.
In addition, there is no effective procedure to access financial
transaction information that will be generated at a subsequent time.
The timely acquisition of such information may be relevant in any
case where law enforcement has reasonable grounds to believe that
a target of a financial investigation will use a financial institution.
Canada does not have a production order procedure in its proceeds
of crime provisions. This frequently means that, unless existing
wiretap intercepts happen to catch a conversation between a target
and the target's bank, the investigator can miss essential information. Co-operation would assist a criminal investigation and result
in timelier discovery of evidence.
We need to consider the information lag between the accumulation of financial or other information by an individual, business,
or regulator and law enforcement. Law enforcement would like to
have this information immediately. It is relevant to the investigation of a financial crime. The speed in which this type of information is shared depends upon the regulator's enabling legislation, the
knowledge that the information exists and the need for law
enforcement's access to the information. Even if this issue is
resolved, we continue to have a problem. Regulators in the course

17. In R. v. Lillico (1994), 92 C.C.C. (3d) 90 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div), Mr. Justice
McCombs rejected an argument that a bank officer's disclosure of banking
information tainted the subsequent search warrant and seizure of the bank records.
There was no s. 8 problem since the disclosed information did not reveal the "biographical core" of the accused's financial information. In another Ontario case,
R. v. Rotondi (unreported) Dec. 8, 1994 Hamilton, Ontario Court Gen. Div,
Marshall J. held that a Bank which voluntarily co-operated with the police and
provided a customer's account information breached s. 8 of the Charter. In R.
Eddy (1994), 119 Nfld. & P.E.I.R 91(Nfld. S.C.T.D.), Mr. Justice Puddester
reached the same conclusion. In that case more than "confirmatory information"
was disclosed. In R. v. Eyob (unreported) Dec. 5, 1994-Supreme Court of British
Columbia, Maczko J., Van. Reg. CC931456, access to bank information, absent a
warrant, infringed s. 8 of the Charter.
18. R.S.C. 1985, Chap C.-46, Section 462.47. Note that the Income Tax Act
is specifically excluded from this provision. Section 462.48 contains an exceptional
provision to obtain a search warrant for tax information.
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of their duties obtain the information. Does the ability to voluntarily disclose financial information solve this problem? The
immediate response is that it does not since the issue of subsequent
admissibility of the information continues (see below).
If a regulator finds the information in the course of its
administrative search of a business the automatic dissemination of
the information to law enforcement is not the panacea suggested by
the Summit recommendation. In Canada, the suggested transmission of the information to law enforcement invites a Charter
challenge. This is more important than any potential dissemination
delay between the regulator and law enforcement. The regulator
may be able to voluntarily pass the necessary information on to law
enforcement. This does not eliminate all concerns with respect to
the use that law enforcement may make of the information. If the
information cannot be admitted at a trial, or its receipt taints
subsequent criminal investigations, we have a greater problem.
Conversely, if a business holds the information and voluntarily
gives the information to law enforcement we may still have a
Charterconcern.
In Canada the Proceeds of Crime (money laundering) Act 19
contains an explicit statement that records are required to be
maintained "to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of
offenses... ,.20The problem is that the act does not provide an
automatic means to access a financial institution's records. One
author defined the issue raised by this particular statute as a
conflict between a paternalistic mandatory reporting framework
and a laissez-faire strategy.21 Ultimately, this author suggests that
"targeted" mandatory reporting is warranted in appropriate
cases. 22 The laissez-faire strategy is not very persuasive. The
Charter risk is that subsequent investigations can be tainted unless
a judicial authorization is obtained. That order justifies access to
and use of the information.
The FATF has addressed the issue of mandatory suspicious
transaction reporting in Recommendation 15 of its 40 Recommendation.23 It advocates a mandatory suspicious transaction report-

19. Supra at note 16.
20. Section 2
21. Christopher J. Kent, The Canadianand InternationalWar Against Money
Laundering: Legal Perspectives, 35 CRIM. L. Q. 21 at p. 24.
22. Id at 32.
23. Recommendation 15 states, "If financial institutions suspect that funds
stem from a criminal activity, they should be required to report promptly their
suspicions to the competent authorities."
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ing requirement. Financial institutions should be required to
promptly report when they "suspect" funds in their possession
come from criminal activity. The regulator/law enforcement cooperation recommendation takes this issue one step further by
requiring regulators to share information.
Canada is considering the FATF's Recommendation 15.24 We
must consider this issue in light of our Charter. In any scenario
where nations are participating in a regime where regulators are
committed to full co-operation with law enforcement the original
"regulatory" justification for the initial collection of the information
shifts to a criminal enforcement purpose when it is passed on to law
enforcement. This problem is magnified when the co-operation
extends to law enforcement in other countries.
Essentially, the issue involves information collection by an
agent of the state, i.e. the regulator, for one purpose and a decision
to share that information for a crime prevention purpose. This may
be the legislated purpose in any Suspicious Transaction Reporting
Agency but the same argument cannot be made for other regulators. We could examine this issue from the simple example of a
regulatory regime, such as municipal fire safety inspection, or from
more complex examples such as securities law or banking. Most
individuals might relate to financial institutions rather than the
securities industry and securities regulators.
III. Banking and the Regulatory/Law Enforcement Issue
Our Bank Regulator, the Office of the Superintendent of
Financial Institutions (OSFI) has an important role to play in the
Canadian banking sector. Before reviewing that role, we should
look at the relationship between a bank and its customer. In
Tournier v. National Provincial Bank of England, we see the

common law analysis on the issue of the confidential relationship
between a bank and its clients." Mr. Tournier brought action
against his banker when the bank officials released information to
Tournier's employers. The court recognised a duty of confidentiality between a Bank and its customer. It was not an absolute duty.
One Canadian text on Banking Law indicates that Tournier is

24. In May 1998 a consultation document was circulated on the issue of a
suspicious transaction reporting regime.
25. [1924] 1 K.B. 461 (C.A.). See also Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
v. Sayani [1994] 2 W.W.R. 260 (B.C.C.A.).
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authority for four distinct exceptions to the duty for confidentiality. 6 The author describes these exceptions as (a) where there is
disclosure under compulsion of law; (b) where there is a duty to the
public to disclose; (c) where the legitimate interests of the bank
require disclosure and (d) where the disclosure is made with the
express or implied consent of the customer.
If you examine the decisions of Scrutton L.J. and Atkin L.J.,
in Tournier, both describe the second exception, as one needed to
"prevent crime".2 7 In another era, we might have been able to
argue that this exception permitted banks and the police to
combine their efforts and fully co-operate in a criminal investigation. The Tourner case and the more recent case of Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Sayani would continue to be helpful
in any situation where a bank unilaterally and voluntarily provided
information and the customer subsequently brought action against
the bank. This argument seems futile when the Charter protects
the "biographical core" of an individual's financial information.
In Eddy a court opined, with respect to records in financial
institutions, as follows:
In my view, there is a substantially greater expectation of
privacy relating to the records of an individual's personal
financial position, and the pattern of the individual's operating
on his or her bank account, then with respect to electrical
consumption records. I note that the Crown argues that the
police in this case already had access to the bank book itself
and the account number, and that therefore the only "new"
information they were abstracting in this connection was the
name of the owner. However, in my view that does not lessen
the privacy interest protected. It is one thing to have an
unidentified bank book containing records of deposits and
withdrawals and revealing financial information, when it is not
linked to a name. The linkage of a name to that information
creates at once the intimate relationship between the information and the particular individual, which is the essence of the
privacy interest.'

26. Baxter, Law of Banking (4th ed.) p. 57. See also Standard Investments
Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1985) 22 D.L.R. (4th) 410

(Ont.C.A.).
27. Supra, note 24 at pages 481 and 486. This factor was an essential element
in the British Columbia Court of Appeal's decision in Sayani.
28. Supra, note 10, at 126, paragraph 176.
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It would have been interesting to see what the court would
have thought of the prevention of crime dicta in Tournier. The net
effect of the determination with respect to the Bank's disclosure
was that the Crown was prohibited from issuing a subpoena to the
Bank to produce its records in Court.2 9
Considering all of the facts, the activity in question in Eddy
constituted a search in circumstances to which the provisions of s.
8 of the Charter apply. I think the situation, involving as it does
information about the personal financial status and dealings and
intimate lifestyle details of the individual involve a high expectation
of privacy. I see no difference between a situation where the police
ask for and are given the information by its holder (the bank) by
telephone, and one where the police physically attend at the
premises and ask for the same information to be produced.3" In
its review of the "reasonableness" of the access to the bank
information the officer, in Eddy, testified that he thought that no
warrant was required since he viewed the bank as the equivalent of
a willing third party providing information. His lordship, at page
128 paragraph 189, also held that the Crown failed to demonstrate
a statutory or common law authority for the request for Bank
information.
To complete the picture we now need to consider the dissemination of customer information collected by Canada's bank
regulator. The principal banking regulator in Canada is the
Superintendent of Financial Institutions. The Superintendent, or
the employees in the Office of the Superintendent of Financial
Institutions, acting under the authority of Office of the Superintendent of FinancialInstitutions Act31 , as set out in section 3.1 of the
Act, has the following legislated purpose:
The purpose of this Act is to ensure that financial institutions
are regulated by an office of the Government of Canada so as
to contribute to public confidence in the Canadian financial
system.
In order to accomplish the purpose I can summarise the
legislated object of the Superintendent and officers into four main
functions. 32 These are to (a) supervise financial institutions in

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 132-137.
Id. at 127, 128.
R.S.C, 1985, c. 18 (3rd Supp.).
Id. at subsection 4(2).
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order to determine whether they are in sound financial condition;
(b) to promptly advise the management and board of directors of
a financial institution in the event the institution is not in sound
financial condition or is not complying with its governing statute
law or supervisory requirements; (c) to promote the adoption of
policies and procedures designed to control and manage risk and
(d) to monitor and evaluate system-wide or sectoral events or
issues that may have a negative impact on the financial condition
of financial institutions. The Regulator accomplishes these objects
by establishing policies and guidelines and undertaking inspections
of the institutions that are subject to the supervision of the office.
In this last activity, the staff of the Office will come across
information in the possession of a financial institution. I assume
that this information may sometimes provide evidence or intelligence on a financial crime. The commitment to co-operate with
law enforcement is the sine qua non of the G7 Finance Minister's
recommendation. Yet, OSFI does not have unfettered discretion
to pass on information it collects to law enforcement.3 3 It should

33. Section 22 applies. This section reads as follows:
22. (1) Subject to subsection (3), all information
(a) regarding the business or affairs of a financial institution or persons dealing
therewith that is obtained by the Superintendent, or by any person acting under
the direction of the Superintendent, as a result of the administration or enforcement of any Act of Parliament,
(b) received by any member of the committee established by subsection 18(1), or
by any person referred to in subsection 18(5) designated by any member thereof,
in the course of an exchange of information permitted by subsection 18(3),
(c) furnished to the Superintendent pursuant to section 516 of the Bank Act, or
(d) obtained by the Superintendent as a result of an application to the Governor
in Council for a consent referred to in subsection 521(1) of the Bank Act,
is confidential and shall be treated accordingly.
22(2) Nothing in subsection (1) prevents the Superintendent from disclosing any
information
(a) to any government agency or body that regulates or supervises financial
institutions, for purposes related to that regulation or supervision,
(a.01) to any other agency or body that regulates or supervises financial
institutions, for purposes related to that regulation or supervision,
(a.1) to the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation or any compensation
association designated by order of the Minister pursuant to subsection 449(1) or
591(1) of the Insurance Companies Act, for purposes related to its operation, and
(b) to the Deputy Minister of Finance or any officer of the Department of Finance
authorized in writing by the Deputy Minister of Finance or to the Governor of the
Bank of Canada or any officer of the Bank of Canada authorized in writing by the
Governor of the Bank of Canada, for the purposes of policy analysis related to the
regulation of financial institutions,
if the Superintendent is satisfied that the information will be treated as confidential by the agency, body or person to whom it is disclosed.
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be noted that the disclosure provisions do not permit disclosure to
law enforcement. This creates a significant impediment with
respect to any co-operation between the Office and law enforcement.
IV. Other General Laws
Even if we assume that there was an ability to disclose in a
regulator's enabling legislation we need to consider other laws of
general applicability. This is very important when the law
enforcement agency requesting the information is outside Canada.
Canada has specific legislation, at both the federal and provincial
levels, protecting privacy. The legislation is primarily applicable to
the public sector. The federal legislation provides for exceptions
where an investigative body listed in the regulations is involved or
where disclosure is made after an agreement between the federal
and provincial governments or institutions established by them and
alternatively, by agreement, with foreign governments or their
institutions.34 Similar exceptions exist in some provincial legisla-

22(3) The Superintendent shall disclose, at such times and in such manner as the
Minister may determine, such information obtained by the Superintendent under
the Bank Act, the Cooperative Credit Associations Act, the Insurance Companies
Act and the Trust and Loan Companies Act as the Minister considers ought to be
disclosed for the purposes of the analysis of the financial condition of a financial
institution and that
(a) is contained in returns filed pursuant to the Superintendent's financial
regulatory reporting requirements; or
(b) has been obtained as a result of an industry-wide or sectoral survey conducted
by the Superintendent in relation to an issue or circumstances that could have an
impact on the financial condition of financial institutions.
22(4) The Minister shall consult with the Superintendent before making any
determination under subsection (3).
22(5) Subject to any regulations made under a statute referred to in subsection (3)
governing the use by a financial institution of any information supplied to it by its
customers, no information obtained by a financial institution regarding any of its
customers shall be disclosed or made available under subsection (3).
22(6) The Superintendent shall prepare a report, to be included in the report
referred to in section 25, respecting the disclosure of information by financial
institutions and describing the state of progress made in enhancing the disclosure
of information in the financial services industry.
34. The Privacy Act, R.S.C. c. P- 21, section 8. This section starts with the
proposition, in subsection 8(1), that personal information shall not, without the
consent of the individual to whom it relates, be disclosed by the institution. It
then goes on, in subsection 8(2 ), to establish various exceptions ... A summary
of one exception, subparagraph 8(2)(f), allows disclosure to foreign states but it
requires an agreement or arrangement between the Government of Canada or an
institution of the Government of Canada (such as OSFI) and the government of
a foreign state, or any institution of any such government, for the purpose of
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tion. Provincial privacy laws would control the dissemination of
their information, subject to their regulator's enabling legislation.
The fact that disclosure of personal information may be disclosed
as a consistent use under privacy legislation does not mean that this
obviates Charter concerns. It would, however, generally indicate
that the regulatory agency's legislation does not prohibit such
disclosure.
In addition, all information that is not in the public domain is
subject to such common law protections as solicitor-client privilege,
informer privilege and confidentiality. If information held by a
regulatory agency falls within any of these categories law enforcement's expectations can be frustrated. The regulator and law
enforcement must consider this issue. Each may have to satisfy
specific pre-conditions before their information can be shared.
V.

Conclusion

Canadian law illustrates a number of concerns when a
suggestion is made that regulators and law enforcement co-operate.
The reason for the co-operation is very important. If the cooperation shifts the use of the information from a regulatory or
civil context to a criminal or quasi-criminal context we have some
problems. The need for greater co-operation may be justified but
our constitutional protections need to be considered.
In addition, the impetus to co-operate between countries may
be another significant problem. There may be a method to cooperate between regulators in different countries. Given the
movement to a globalised business environment such regulatory cooperation is essential. When the co-operation moves beyond the
regulators to law enforcement all of the concerns set out above are
magnified.
Organised crime does not recognise international borders.
Laws and States exist in a world where borders create problems.
The Summit recommendation is an excellent starting point but we
still have a lot of work to bring the recommendation to reality.

administering or enforcing any law or carrying out a lawful investigation.

